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This thesis explores issues relevant to U.S./Japan
burdensharing. As U.S. defense expenditures are reduced in
the 1990's, U.S. allies will be called upon to contribute a
greater share to meet common security responsibilities.
Japan's government faces a multitude of constraints to
increasing defense expenditures placed upon them by the U.S.,
the Japanese public and Japan's Asian neighbors. Some of these
constraints are affected significantly by Japanese perceptions
of U.S. commitment and the Soviet threat. If perceptions of
the Soviet threat diminish while perceptions of the U.S.
commitment remain strong, Japan may be less inclined to
increase their expenditures to the levels called for by the
U.S. This thesis explores constraints to increased Japanese
defense spending, Japanese perceptions of U.S. commitment,
Soviet threat perceptions in Japan, and also indicates areas
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a fiscal year 1983 U.S. Annual Report to Congress,
Japan was described as "...playing a vital role in maintain-
ing regional stability and...the cornerstone of the U.S.
forward defense strategy in the Asian-Pacific region." (Tokin-
oya, 1986, p.8) Japan was also described by one U.S. Senator
as an "ally who basks in the freedom our defense provides, but
does little to share the burden of paying for it." (Cushman,
1988, p.2) This dichotomy is often expressed by U.S. critics
when considering Japan as an ally. Although Japan is the
U.S.'s number one ally in Asia, her one percent of GNP defense
contributions' compared to U.S. perceptions of Japanese wealth
and ability to contribute, have caused many Americans to
believe that Japan is enjoying a "free ride" on American
defense spending and capability.
Since the close of World War II Japan has relied on the
United States to deter Soviet expansion in the Far East and
to defend Japan from any regional threats. Japan's U.S.
imposed Constitution renounced war and revoked the right of
belligerency of the nation. Constitutional interpretation
I Closer to two percent using the NATO accounting method
which includes military pensions and other personnel costs as
defense outlays (see pg. 44-45)
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has allowed Japan to maintain forces but none greater than
those necessary for self defense. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between Japan and the U.S. committed
the U.S. to an armed response in Japan's support in the event
of any attack.
Japan' s once devastated postwar economy has steadily grown
stronger and is now one of the world's leading economies.
Despite its stronger economy, Japan's defense contributions
have significantly lagged behind those of the U.S. and, until
recently, behind those of the major NATO allies (Great
Britain, France, West Germany). Japanese defense expendi-
tures have rarely exceeded one percent of their gross national
product, while U.S. expenditures are close to six percent.
The growing public unrest in America caused by a more
powerful Japanese economy and U.S. perceptions of Japan's
"free ride" have pressured some members of the U.S. Congress
to demand a greater defense contribution from Japan. The U.S.
federal budget deficit, growing social problems in America and
political changes in Eastern Europe will likely bring about
a substantial reduction in U.S. defense spending in the
1990's. This reduction may bring additional pressure upon
Japan to increase its contributions.
Although the U.S. has consistently sought a greater con-
tribution from Japan, social, political, and legal factors
2
explain Japan's reluctance to comply. A Constitution and
other laws that forbid war, an anti-military public sentiment
fueled by a pro-constitution, liberal press, Asian neighbors
that would likely be opposed to any further Japanese defense
build up, and a multiparty political system including parties
which assert that any defense structure is unconstitutional
are just a few of these factors.
This thesis explores some of the public policy issues
relevant to U.S./Japan defense burdensharing. This paper is
not an attempt to verify whether Japan is contributing her
"fair share" to the common defense, nor is it a repetition of
the political rhetoric on either sides of the issue. Although
Japan has increased its contributions over the past decade,
U.S. perceptions of Japanese wealth lead many Americans to
believe that Japan can do more. Yet,. few Americans realize
the multitude of constraints Japanese policy makers face when
confronting their own defense and national security issues.
This thesis provides insight into the various constraints
placed upon Japan's defense and national security policy. It
also presents an analysis of economic theories of military
alliances in attempt to better understand the U.S./Japan
defense relationship.
3
Specifically this thesis investigates the following
national defense policy issues:
(1) Constraints imposed upon the Japanese government's
defense and national security policies by the U.S., Japanese
public and press, and Japan's Asian neighbors
(2) Present initiatives underway to increase Japan's
defense contributions
(3) Implications of Japanese perceptions of U.S. defense
commitment and Soviet threat for Japan's defense spending
This thesis provides an historical background on the
U.S./Japan defense relationship. It discusses Japan's con-
tributions towards the common defense through both its defense
structure and host nation support contributions provided for
U.S. forces in Japan. This thesis also analyzes the politi-
cal, lo-gal, and social factors that constrain larger Japan-
ese defense contributions. It concludes with a discussion of
a commitment-based economic theory of military alliances and
an analysis of U.S. commitment to the U.S./Japan alliance.
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II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. 1945-1960 TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
In September 1945, aboard the battleship U.S.S. Missouri,
representatives of the Japanese government surrendered to
formally mark the close of World War II. What had begun with
the 1910 annexation of Korea and the 1937 war in Manchuria,
ended ignominiously with the dropping of two atomic bombs by
the U.S. on mainland Japan. Japan's plans for hegemony over
Asia lay shattered among the ruins of the nation.
A formal Treaty of Peace was signed on 8 September 1951
restoring full sovereignty for the islands and territorial
waters to the newly formed Japanese government. Japan gained
full independence the following year. U.S. Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles urged Japan to begin rearming immediately
after regaining its sovereignty (Reed, 1983, p.7). However,
the new Japanese government's first priority was rebuilding
their country and they declined Secretary Dulles' suggestions
citing Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. This ar-
ticle, largely attributed to General Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, states:
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Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use
of forces as a means of settling international disputes ....
land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential
will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized. (Adams, 1988, p.69)
To provide Japan with security from international con-
flicts prior to its rearming, a U.S./Japan Security Treaty was
signed. The Treaty declared that as a "provisional arrange-
ment" the United States would provide security for Japan, but
"...Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for
its own defense against direct and indirect aggression."
(Reed, 1983, p.7) The Security Treaty provided for the
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan in exchange for the
commitment of these forces to come to the aid of Japan in the
event of an attack. This arrangement with the U.S. came to
be known as the "Yoshida Strategy" after Japanese Prime Mini-
ster Shigeru Yoshida.
The outbreak of the Korean War was the impetus for the
first rearming of Japan. As U.S. forces stationed in Japan
were pulled into combat in Korea, General MacArthur ordered
the Japanese to form a 75,000 man Police Reserve Force. This
force, which later added a maritime component, became the
National Safety Force and formed the core of the Japanese Self
Defense Forces. The Japanese Defense Agency, a Cabinet level
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agency overseeing the defense establishment, and the Self
Defense Forces, Japan's military component, were formed in
1954 with the passage by the Japanese Diet of the Defense
Agency Establishment Law and the Self Defense Forces Law. In
1954, a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed by the
U.S. and Japan, permitting the U.S. to provide a flow of
military equipment and technology to Japan.
The U.S./Japan security treaty was challenged from its
inception as unconstitutional by Japanese political parties
opposed to the creation of any Japanese defense force. The
ensuing controversy consumed much of the early debate on
Japanese defense until the Japanese Supreme Court decided that
the security treaty was constitutional. The Supreme Court
decision involved a 1957 riot at Tachikawa Air Base near
Tokyo. Plans had been developed to extend the base's main
runway into an adjacent field. A riot began when surveyors
came to the base and several rioters who trespassed on base
property were arrested. The Tokyo District Court found them
not guilty. The District Court decided that the security
treaty "...was unconstitutional because it provided for the
stationing of U.S. forces in Japan." (Kim, 1969, p.18) The
U.S. forces constituted "war potential" and were, therefore,
unconstitutional under Article IX of the Japanese
7 ---
Constitution. Therefore, the trespassing laws enacted under
the treaty were also deemed unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court overturned the decision in 1959 stating
that "war potential" is that which Japan has command and
control over. Furthermore, they decided that Japan's right
to enter into a security agreement with another nation and
right to self defense were not unconstitutional:
Naturally, the above in no way denies the inherent right
of self defense, which our country possesses as a sover-
eign nation, and the pacifism of our Constitution has never
provided for either defenselessness or non-resistance .... If
there are to be guarantees of the security of our country
in order to preserve its peace and security, it is natural
that we be able to select.. .appropriate measures and
methods regarded as suitable under existing international
conditions. Article IX of the Constitution in no way
prohibits a request to another country for security
guarantees for the maintenance of peace and safety of our
country. (Maki, 1964, p.303)
A Basic Policy for National Defense was adopted by the
Cabinet of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi in 1957. This policy
declared that "... the objective of national defense is to
prevent direct and indirect aggression..." but "...to repel
such aggression" if necessary (Reed, 1983, p.44). However,
the main thrust of the policy was to depend on the U.S.
defense umbrella for Japan's security. The policy's elements
are to: (1) support the United Nations; (2) promote public
welfare and enhance patriotism; (3) develop an effective self
8
defense capability; and (4) to "...deal with external aggres-
sion on the basis of the Japan/U.S. security arrangement."
(Reed, 1983, p.45)
B. 1960 - 1976 NATIONAL DEFINSI PROGRAM OUTLINE
In 1960 Prime Minister Kishi sought to revise the 1951
Security Treaty. Japan wanted "...an explicit commitment from
the United States to defend Japan from external attack,
elimination of the controversial section dealing with inter-
nal security, more mutuality regarding consultations, and a
fixed termination date." (Reed, 1983, p.8) The United States
wanted a firmer commitment from Japan to aid in the defense
of the western Pacific. In the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Coop-
eration and Security the Japanese attained their goals, but
the U.S. received no further commitments from Japan.
Article V of the treaty states:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes. (Van de
Velde, 1988, p.17)
However, unlike the NATO alliance, which provides for mutual
security, the U.S./Japan alliance is one sided and does not
require Japan to defend U.S. interests outside Japanese terri-
tories. The Treaty has recently been described as
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"... enshrin (ing) not a mutual defence alliance, but a lopsided
contract in which most of the responsibilities and obliga-
tions for Japan's defence fall to America." (Buzan, 1988,
p.558)
A Status Of Forces Agreement was signed as per the Treaty
providing a division of responsibilities and a legal basis for
the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. As per the agree-
ment, Japan was to provide land and facilities without cost
to the U.S. The U.S. agreed to bear "without cost to Japan"
all expenses for the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan (Reed,
1983, p.22).
The 1960 Treaty proved to be extremely unpopular with
Japanese opposition parties, but was rammed through the Diet
by the Prime Minister. The opposition parties, with the aid
of the liberal, pro-constitution press, sparked wide spread
protests against the treaty, eventually forcing the cancel-
lation of President Eisenhower's visit to Tokyo. The social
movement against the treaty, known in Japan as "Ampo" was
similar in many ways to U.S. student protests against the war
in Vietnam. "The youthful idealism of my generation found its
expression in the demonstrations against the security trea-
ty,"2 stated Koichi Kato, Director General of the Japanese
2 Stated in a speech before the Trilateral Commission, Tokyo
Plenary Meeting, Tokyo on 21 April 1985.
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Defense Agency (Kato, 1985, p.325). The Treaty became so
unpopular with the opposition parties that party members had
to be physically removed from the chamber when they blocked
the entrance to prevent the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives from calling a vote on the treaty.
The "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" that have guided Japan-
ese security policy to the present were first enunciated by
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in 1967. These principles -
S...not possessing, manufacturing, or allowing the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons" (Van de Velde, 1988, p.38) - were
later adopted as a Diet resolution in 1971. The principles,
however, have not prevented Japan from relying on the pro-
tection of the nuclear umbrella of the U.S. In addition,
although Japan does not possess nuclear weapons, it stated in
the Japanese Defense Agency's 1970 White Paper on Defense that
it would not be unconstitutional to do so:
It would be possible to say that in a legal and theo-
retical sense, possession of small nuclear weapons, falling
within the minimum requirement for capacity necessary for
self defense and not possessing a threat of aggression to
other countries, would be permissible. (Reed, 1983, p.26)
C. 1976 - PRESENT
In accordance with the Basic Policy for National Defense,
Japan began building up her defense forces starting in the
mid 1950's. Four build-up plans were initiated from 1956 to
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1976. At the conclusion of the fourth plan in 1976 Japan
introduced the National Defense Program Outline (see TABLE
#1). In light of a perceived waning of American presence in
Asia in the 1970's, Japan established new objectives and
responsibilities for the Defense Agency and the Self Defense
Forces.
The National Defense Program Outline marked a turning
point in Japanese defense history as the outline developed a
strategy for weapons acquisition planning. The defense
outline was based on the premise that Japan would repel
S...limited and small scale aggression." The Japanese
believed that a large scale attack by an opposing force would
be deterred by the political impact such an attack would have
on the international community. The strategy was one of
"threshold deterrence", i.e. forcing an adversary to attack
with a force large enough to immediately invoke American
intervention. (Simon, 1986, pp.30-33)
To realize the objectives of the outline, the Japanese
Defense Agency instituted the Mid-Term Defense Program
Estimate, a five year planning document providing a priori-
tization of defense objectives to be used in annual budget-
ing.3 The expected rise in the defense budget led the
3 The Mid Term Defense Estimate was elevated to the status of
a government document under Prime Minister Nakasone.
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TABLE #1
JAPANESE FORCE STRUCTURE UNDER THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE
SDF Personnel Quota 180,000 personnel
Ground SDF Units deployed
regionally in 12 Divisions
Basic Units peacetime 2 Composite Brig.






ground to air missile 8 Anti-air
Artillery
Maritime SDF Anti-Sub Surface Ship
Units (for mobile ops) 4 Escort Flots
Anti-sub Surface Ship
Basic Units Units (Regional District) 10 Divisions
Submarine Units 6 Divisions
Minesweeping Units 2 Flotillas
Land-based Anti-Sub
Aircraft Units 16 Squadrons
Major Anti-Sub Surface Ships Apx. 60 Ships
Equipment Submarines 16 Submarines
Combat Aircraft Apx. 220 Aircraft
Air SDF Aircraft Control and
Warning Units 28 Groups
Interceptor Units 10 Squadrons
Basic Units Support Fighter Units 3 Squadrons
Air Reconnaissance Units 1 Squadron
Air Transport Units 3 Squadrons
Early Warning Units 1 Squadron
High Altitude Ground-to-
Air Missile Units 6 Groups
Major Combat Aircraft Apx. 430 Aircraft
Equipment
Source: (Reed, 1983, p.48)
13
government of Prime Minister Miki to decide in 1976 that
defense spending "...will be limited to not more than one
percent of the estimated gross national product of each fiscal
year for the time being." (Reed, 1983, p.24) This policy was
designed to please both those calling for increased defense
spending and for those against it. As the Japanese economy
grew, defense spending would increase, but it would be
controlled and would not cut into domestic spending.
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira began the first major
increases in defense spending under the Outline, but died
suddenly in 1980. His successor, Genko Suzuki initially
followed up on Ohira's policies. Unfortunately, he was a
compromise choice of the ruling party. Despite being in a
weak political position, almost unable to stop his cabinet -
"... men who equaled or exceeded him in stature" (Feldman,
1981, p.36) - from raiding proposed defense expenditures for
their own ministries, Suzuki pushed through substantial
defense increases in JFY 81 and 82.
It was under Prime Minister Suzuki, however, that Japan
announced its most definitive military responsibility.
Following a May 1981 summit meeting with President Reagan,
Suzuki stated:
14
Japan on its own initiative and in accordance with its
Constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to make
even greater efforts for improving its defense capabili-
ties in Japanese territories and in its surrounding air and
sea space, and for further alleviating the financial burden
of U.S. forces in Japan (GAO/NSIAD, 198 9,p.15-16) .... our
defense efforts will now cover several hundred nautical
miles of our surrounding waters and 1000 miles of sealanes
from our shores. (Niksch, 1982, p.85) (see Figure #1)
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Although attacked by the press on his return to Tokyo for
using the term "alliance" in describing the U.S./Japan
relationship, Suzuki increased Japan's defense budget 7.61%
and 7.75% respectively in JFY 1981 and 1982.
While Suzuki tried to play down the military connotations
of an alliance, his successor, Yasuhiro Nakasone, did not shy
away from them. Nakasone became the first Prime Minister to
openly discuss burdensharing issues. He even went so far as
to discuss Japan's role in a U.S./Soviet conflict when he
stated that Japan would be like an "...unsinkable aircraft
carrier, putting up a tremendous bulwark of defense against
the infiltration of the (Soviet) Backfire bomber."4 (Tokinoya,
1986, p.5)
Prime Minister Nakasone continued Suzuki's defense budget
increases with a 6.5% increase in JFY 83 despite overall
Japanese government spending remaining relatively constant.
Under continuous pressure from the U.S., Nakasone broke the
formerly sacrosanct 1% limit by proposing a JFY 87 defense
budget of 1.004% of GNP. Though it was only a small increase
in actual expenditures, its symbolic impact was great.
Nakasone's successor, Noboru Takeshita, followed up on this
' Nakasone was misquoted. While translating his remarks, his
interpreter said "unsinkable aircraft carrier," while Nakasone's
actual words were "big aircraft carrier."
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step by breaking the limit again by proposing a defense budget
of 1.01% of GNP in both JFY 88 and 89.
The U.S.'s defense relationship with Japan has been
characterized by U.S. demands for increased Japanese contribu-
tions and a perceived slow Japanese response. Japan's first
priority after the war was to rebuild its nation and economy.
Japan's Constitution and reliance on the U.S. defense umbrella
allowed Japan to place defense as a secondary concern. The
U.S. also benefitted from the relationship as it built a
strategy around forward deployed bases. As Japan's economy
grew stronger and began to compete with the U.S. economy,
demands for more defense increased. Although, U.S. policy
makers have consistently demanded increased defense spending,
Japan's government faces a multitude of constraints that have
slowed Japanese response to American demands. Chapter III of
this thesis details these constraints and the present levels
of Japanese contributions.
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111. U.S./JAPAN B5UDKNSHAPING ISSUIS
A. U.S./JAPAN BURDZNSHARING CONTRIBUTIONS
Japanese contributions to U.S./Japan burdensharing can be
divided into two general categories: (1) that which is spent
by Japan to operate or increase Japan's defense forces, and
(2) host nation support provided by Japan to help offset the
cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. In addition to their
defense structure and the U.S./Japan alliance, Japan also
helps the U.S. to promote and maintain strong alliance
relations among key developing nations through economic means.
Although not considered a direct burdensharing contribution,
Japan's foreign aid budget of over eleven billion dollars,
larger than the U.S. foreign aid budget, complements U.S.
foreign policy and helps to maintain stability in areas of
interest to the western alliance.
Before the Japanese defense build-up in the mid 1980's,
the Self Defense Forces were woefully incapable of defending
the Japanese islands, much less capable of upholding Prime
Minister Suzuki's 1000 mile sealane commitment. Francis West,
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs told the U.S. Congress in March 1982, that Japan
lacked the capability to defend its air and sea lanes out to
18
1000 miles and that "...owing to these shortcomings, the Self
Defense Forces do not constitute an effective deterrence."
(Reed, 1983, p.52) The Ground SDF was short of ammunition and
supplies and was not capable of sustaining troops in the field
for more than a few days. Fuel shortages forced the Air SDF
pilots to log less than half the flight hours of their
American counterparts and, due to a shortage of weapons, less
than half of the pilots had ever fired a live weapon. No
command and control structure existed and the SDF lacked
coordination between its three branches.
In 1982, the Maritime SDF had 34 destroyers and 15 fri-
gates ill-equipped to operate against the increased Soviet
submarine threat. Their primary anti-submarine weapon, the
MK 44 torpedo, was obsolete. They lacked any surface to air
missile capabilities and had no interceptor or attack air-
craft. Although their primary mission was to prevent Soviet
access to the Pacific through the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima
Straits, the Japanese had only one operational mine laying
vessel and possessed obsolete mines. Hara Toru, the Director
of the Defense Bureau, JDA, told the Diet in 1980 that it
would take six months to mine the straits and that the MSDF
could not prevent the Soviets from using the straits (Niksch,
1982, pp.81-82).
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With the increases in Japan's defense budgets during the
last fifteen years, and the strong growth in the value of the
Japanese yen, the capabilities of the SDF have increased
considerably. After under funding two earlier Mid Term
Defense Estimates, Japan has fully funded the third estimate
and will reach the objectives of the NDPO by 1991 if funding
continues (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.14). Meeting the objectives of
the NDPO will give Japan the minimum necessary capability to
fulfill their commitment to defend their sealanes out to 1000
miles.
The Mid Term Defense Estimate for 1986-1990 budgets total
expenditures of 18.4 trillion yen (U.S. $147.2 billion) at
1985 prices. Upon completion of the program the JSDF will
possess:
- 324 combat aircraft including 187 F-15 fighter/bombers
- 12 E-2C early warning radar planes
- 62 destroyers and frigates
- 16 conventionally powered submarines
- 94 P-3C Orions anti-submarine planes
- 55 SSM-1 anti-ship missile launchers
- 5 groups of Patriot surface to air missiles
(Kawaguchi, 1989, p.24)
In addition, the JFY 1988 budget of 3.7 trillion yen included
the purchase of two Aegis class destroyers which are to be
completed in Japan and 60 SH60J Seahawk helicopters made under
U.S. license in Japan (Wall St Journal, 1987, p.44)
20
Japanese host nation contributions to support U.S. forces
stationed in Japan comprise four major areas: the Facilities
Improvement Program, Labor Cost sharing, private land lease
and base countermeasures, and miscellaneous expenses. In JFY
1987, $1.6 billion (234 billion yen) was outlayed among these
four categories. In addition, foregone revenues by the
Government of Japan from the U.S. military (exempted taxes,
tolls and custom charges) not included in the totals above
amounted to $654 million (90.9 billion yen) for a total of
$2.3 billion (324 billion yen) (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.23). This
support equals approximately $45,000 per U.S. service member
stationed in Japan,' the largest amount of any allied nation
(Defense, 1988, p.63).
The Facilities Improvement Program funds projects to
improve the quality of life for U.S. service members and their
families stationed in Japan. These projects include family
and bachelor housing, sewage and water treatment facilities
and recreational facilities. Recent budgets also have
included operational support facilities. When the program
began in 1979, $100 million (22.7 billion yen) had been
5 The Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel (1988) found,
however, that this amount also included "non-outlays" such as
foregone revenues for the rent free land used by American bases.
If these items are removed the amount provided is closer to $32,000
per serviceman.
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appropriated. By JFY 1987, the amount had increased to $562
million (78.2 billion yen). (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.27)
The rising cost of Japanese labor and the escalating value
of the yen have increased Japanese contributions in labor
related areas. Article XII of the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) states that, "...local labor requirements of the United
States Armed Forces.. .shall be satisfied with the assistance
of the Japanese authorities." (Reed, 1983, p.42) In 1977 the
United States and Japan signed the first of three agreements
on increased Japanese support. A second agreement was signed
the following year. Although the U.S. tried again in 1981,
1982, 1984 and subsequently to increase Japanese contributions
in this area, the Japanese refused. A third cost sharing
agreement was signed in late 1987 but required and received
ratification by the Diet as the agreement was considered
beyond the existing SOFA.
The 1987 cost-sharing agreement will save the U.S. ap-
proximately $125 million each year (in 1987 dollars). In
March 1988, a protocol was signed amending the agreement which
should save the U.S. an additional $125 million. (GAO/NSIAD,
1989, p.26) Under these cost sharing agreements the Japanese
Government pays approximately 40% of the total salaries and
benefits for the 21,000 member U.S. Forces Japan, Japanese
labor force (Defense, 1988, p.34).
22
Leases on private land used by U.S. forces and base coun-
termeasures expenditures totaled $663.3 million (92.2 billion
yen) in JFY 87 (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.24). Approximately 52% of
the land used by U.S. armed forces is private land, rented by
the Japanese government and given free of charge to the U.S.
Base countermeasures are projects undertaken to improve the
areas surrounding bases for the local citizens. These
measures are important as they help foster a positive image
of the U.S. and SDF armed forces in the local areas. These
investments include noise abatement, nuisance prevention,
housing relocation, road improvements and grants to local
municipalities.
Japanese contributions for miscellaneous expenses totaled
$197.9 million (27.5 billion yen) in JFY 87 (GAO/NSIAD, 1989,
p.28) These expenses include a relocation construction pro-
gram to construct new facilities for U.S. forces moved off
Japanese rented private lands. They also cover any property
damage and pay compensation to the Japanese fishing industry
for losses incurred as a result of U.S. Naval presence.
Although Japan has increased its contributions, what is
most significant about this increase in spending is that much
if not the majority of it has come about through the changes
in the value of the yen. The total host nation contributions
toward U.S. forces in Japan increased from $1,000.4 million
23
in 1981 to $2,337.5 million in 1987. This represents a 134%
increase in U.S. dollars. When measured in yen the increase
from 228.1 billion to 324.9 billion represents only a 42%
increase. Although a 42% increase does amount to approximate-
ly six percent each year, the difference between percentages
in yen and dollars is significant (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.23)
B. POLITICAL/SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS TO INCREASED SPENDING
Japan is placed into a difficult situation by the
complexity of demands made by U .S. policy makers. Japan's
position has been described as being "... torn between domesti-
cally generated pressures for a conciliatory, cautious
leadership style and external pressure for a more positive,
high-risk and active leadership role." (Eikenberry, 1982,
p.15) While lauding Japan as America's number one economic
ally, Congress has been especially vocal in their criticism
of Japanese defense spending. Congressional suggestions for
increased spending have included charging Japan an annual
security tax of two percent of GNP (Congressman Stephen Neal
(D-NC)) and negotiations to update the 1960 Security Treaty
to establish a full partnership (Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC))
(Tokinoya, 1986, p.11). Representative Patricia Schroeder
(D-Col), an outspoken critic of defense, has even suggested
a "defense protection fee" charged to all Japanese imports to
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display the relationship between their economic prosperity and
their "free ride." (Fallows, 1989, p.17)
Many Japanese perceive that these demands for increased
defense spending are driven more by U.S. budget problems than
by any increased Soviet or regional threat to Japanese
interest. This makes it difficult to obtain a consensus in
Japan to increase defense spending. Japan's own unique
political situation reflects a Constitution that renounces war
and forbids maintaining "war potential", a need for national
consensus in an often sharply divided multiparty system, an
anti-military press and public sentiment, Asian neighbors who
do not wish to see Japan become a military power, and a
politically weak defense agency. This set of circumstances
creates an even more difficult position for Japanese policy
makers when they consider increases in burdensharing with the
U.S.
Japan's multiparty political system and its need for
consensus have contributed significantly to Japan's reluc-
tance to increase defense spending. The Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) has been the ruling party since its emergence in
1955, but recent election losses and scandals have increased
the power of the other leading parties. In September 1986,
the LDP held 60% of the upper House of Representatives and 57%
of the lower House of Councilors (Tokinoya, 1986, p.20)
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Although some opposition parties have moved more to the
center on defense issues to attract greater public support,
they still differ from the LDP. The Komieto (Komie Party) and
the Democratic Socialist Party, once staunch opponents of the
JSDF and the 1960 Security Treaty have become more realistic
on defense. The Komieto's call in the 1960's for "immediate
abrogation" of the treaty has shifted to an admittance that
the ". ..security treaty plays a certain deterrent role in
Japan's security." (Tokinoya, 1986, p.15) However, the party
does not desire any increase in defense spending. The
Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese Socialist Party have
altered their positions little and still declare the Treaty
and the JSDF to be unconstitutional.
Legal and social constraints reinforce Japanese resis-
tance to a larger defense force. An anti-military public
sentiment post-WWII is present", and is embodied in the
Constitution and other defense establishment laws. This view
is supported by a largely anti-military, pro-constitution
press. The Tokyo "Big Three" newspapers, Asahi Shimbun,
Yomiuri Shimbun, and Mainichi Shimbun, with a combined daily
circulation of over 32 million, have been strongly opposed to
The Daily Yomiuri of 18 April 1978 reported the results of
a poll that showed only 31% of the Japanese public desired a strong
military.
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a military build up and any U.S. intervention into Japan's
internal affairs (Niksch, 1982, pp.90-91).
Japanese defense spending increases also are not looked
upon favorably by many neighboring Asian nations. Most of
Japan's neighbors, including South Korea, Philippines, Indo-
China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore and China, were
victims of Japanese aggression during WWII. They are not
anxious to see a resurgence in Japanese defense capability.
Although some forty five years have passed since the war,
memories of the war are still fresh in the minds of Japan's
neighbors. In 1986, Japan's Education Minister, Masayuki
Fujio, was forced to resign under heavy Chinese and Korean
protests in response to "1... his support for revisionist school
history textbooks and his ill considered remarks implying
Korean complicity in Japan's 1910 annexation of the country."
(Buzan, 1988, p.559) Prime Minister Nakasone publicly apolo-
gized for the statements made by his Minister.
The constraints against a stronger Japanese defense esta-
blishment have kept the Japanese Defense Agency politically
weak. Headed by a Director General, who is a cabinet member,
the JDA is not a ministry such as, for example, the Ministry
of Finance. Rather it is an agency under the direct control
of the Prime Ministers office. The Director General, although
traditionally drawn from the upper ranks of the ruling party,
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is often not a competitor for real power in the party.'
Members of the party aspiring to the Prime Minister's chair
generally seek the more powerful ministry positions (Feldman,
1981, p.34).
The Constitution, Defense Agency Establishment Law and the
Self Defense Forces Law each have been carefully prepared or
interpreted to ensure civilian control over the military. The
top positions in the JDA are filled by civilians and each
military service is headed by a civilian. To prevent any firm
military control, even the Chairman of the Japanese Joint
Staff does not have command over the service commanders. This
predominance - civilian control may be attributed to the
opinion among the Japanese public that an unbridled military
dictatorship led them into World War II.
The Prime Minister exercises, "...the supreme right of
direction and supervision over the Self Defense Forces,"
(Reed, 1983, p.22) through the Director General and with the
approval of the Cabinet, the Diet and the National Defense
Council. This convoluted process of control has led some
military commanders to question the SDF's ability to react in
an emergency. In 1978, General Hiroomi Kurisu, Chairman of
the Japanese Joint Staff, openly criticized Japanese defense
Yasuhiro Nakasone is an exception as he was DG of the JDA
in the late 70's.
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policy. His remarks that front line commanders may need to
take action without proper authority to prevent an invasion
were so contrary to the idea of civilian control that he was
forced to resign immediately.
U.S. attempts to increase Japan's defense spending have
been hampered by a variety of constraints on Japan's govern-
ment. Excessive U.S. demands even contribute to the dilemma
as they place the Japanese government in a more difficult
position trying to satisfy both their own public and U.S.
policy makers. U.S. officials must understand these con-
straints and tailor their requests for increased Japanese
spending with the constraints in mind. This would include,
for example, not requesting Japan to build offensive weapons
that may threaten their Asian neighbors.
U.S. policy makers must also be aware of global politics
as they attempt to increase Japan's contributions. A height-
ened threat perception and/or a weakening of U.S. commitment
will affect Japan's defense spending. Chapter IV analyzes two
economic models of military alliances to provide a better
understanding of how the global enviroment affects Japan's
defense spending.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC THZORIES OF ALLIANCES
A. OLSEN/ZECKRAUSZR THRORY OF ALLIANCES
The U.S./Japan defense relationship must be described as
a military alliance despite the negative connotations that
this word implied to the Japanese media and public during
Prime Minister Suzuki's term. In an alliance, each member-
nation contributes resources in support of the alliance in
order to receive the benefits that the alliance provides.
These resources, the dollars, weapons and land provided, serve
the common interest of each member-nation. In the case of a
military alliance, the common interest of the member-nations
is to deter attack from an opposing force. Generally, nations
form alliances because the deterrence provided by an alliance
is greater than through unilateral and non-allied deterrence.
In 1966, Olsen and Zeckhauser published "An Economic
Theory of Alliances." (1966) Their theory sought to explain
why suboptimality and disproportionality exist in alliances.
Suboptimality exists because the defense provided by the
alliance is a public good. Public goods share two critical
properties, non-exclusivity and non-rivalrous. Non-ex-
clusivity exists when it is not possible, or prohibitively
costly to prevent someone from enjoying the benefits of the
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good. National defense cannot be enjoyed by one citizen, but
denied to his neighbor. Non-rivalrous exists when it does not
cost any additional amount for another individual to enjoy the
benefits of the good. Adding another citizen to the nation
does not remove some of the benefit provided by national
defense to other citizens. Because of these two properties,
individuals do not reveal their true preferences for the
amounts of the public goods that they will provide. In the
abscence of proper incentives to reveal their true preferen-
ces, individuals, as well as nations in the alliance, are less
likely to provide the optimal amounts of the public goods.
In the U.S./Japan alliance, suboptimality exists in both the
U.S. and Japan spending less on defense because of the other
nations defense spending. Disproportionality exists when
there is an "unequal" distribution of the cost burden for the
common defense, and is displayed, for example, in the dis-
parity between each country's defense expenditures compared
to GNP.
In an alliance, the defense contributions of each member-
nation that go to the alliance are public goods. In the
Olsen/Zeckhauser model, the ships of the Seventh Fleet, for
example, are public goods as they provide benefit to both
Japan and the U.S. The benefits they provide cannot be
excluded from Japan, even though the ships are supplied by the
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U.S. The same can be said of the ships of Japan's Maritime
Self Defense Force. If the goal of the defense provided by the
U.S./Japan alliance is to deter a Soviet attack, then both
member-nations benefit and neither can be excluded as the goal
is met.
Olsen and Zeckhauser theorized that this may lead one
member-nation to have little incentive to voluntarily con-
tribute to the alliance. A member-nation may become a "free
rider," i.e. a nation that does not contribute its "fair
share" to meet the common responsibility. Olsen and Zeck-
hauser concluded that nations do not have sufficient incen-
tive to contribute to an alliance if they receive the benefits
already paid for by other nation's contributions. They also
concluded that the dilemma of "free riders" is compounded in
that member-nations placing a higher absolute value on the
benefits of the public good bear a disproportionate share of
the cost responsibility to pay for the alliance.
Olsen and Zeckhauser tested their model on the NATO alliance
in 1966. Their model can be best described by using an
indifference curve map' showing the value a nation places on
S An indifference curve displays the different combinations
of goods that provide an equal level of satisfaction to an indivi-
dual. For example, an indifference curve between apples and
oranges may show that an individual is "indifferent" between a set
of ten apples and two oranges or a set of six apples and six
oranges. For an indepth discussion of indifference maps involving
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defense and non-defense goods (see Figure #2). This indif-
ference map is cut off at a nation's present income line and
turned upside down. A nation's defense capability is measured
along the horizontal axis and valued positively. Defense
expenditures are measured along the vertical axis and valued
negatively. If nation A were not a member of an alliance, its
outlay on defense goods could be shown by drawing a cost curve
(a straight line) from the origin to the intersection (tan-
gent) of the highest indifference curve. The non-allied
nation A's outlay on defense would be (OB).
If nation A were an alliance member, its outlay on defense
would be affected by the outlays of the other allied nations.
As other allies commit their resources towards defense (OD),
nation A obtains (OH) level of defense without additional cost
to themselves, i.e. without giving up any non-defense goods.
As allies increase their outlays on defense, nation A will pay
less to obtain the same level of defense it once enjoyed
without being an alliance member (OB). When the combined
output of the allies is greater than the amount that nation
A would have obtained without an alliance, nation A will not
have to spend anything on defense to receive the level of
private and public goods, ser "The Pure Theory of Public Expendi-







Figure 2 Indifference Curve Map
Source: (Olsen, 1966, p.2 68)
defense it enjoyed without an alliance. Therefore, any
defense level beyond (OB) provided by other allies will
encourage nation A to become a "free rider" and refrain from
contributing any defense expenditure. (Olsen, 1966,
pp.268-269)
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A reaction function" may be created that displays the
amount of defense that nation A will provide for all levels
of defense expenditures provided by its allies. Allied
expenditures, in turn, will also be affected by nation A's
expenditures and their reaction curve may also be determined
(see Figure #3). The intersection point of the curves is the
equilibrium point. "In equilibrium, the defense expenditures
of the two nations are such that the "larger" nation - the one
that places the higher absolute value on the alliance good -
will bear a disproportionately large share of the common
burden." (Olsen, 1966, p.269)
In the U.S./Japan alliance, the U.S. is perceived as the
"larger" nation, the one that places a higher absolute value
on the deterrence benefit. The U.S. has had more global
interest, whereas Japan has been more regionally oriented.
An attack against the alliance by the Soviet Union would be
viewed on a global basis by the U.S. as the U.S. considers the
Soviets to be a global threat. Japan, on the other hand,
perceives the Soviets as a regional threat and would view any
aggression as mainly a regional problem. Therefore, the U.S.
9 A reaction function may be produced for each member-nation
describing its defense expenditures in relation to its allies
defense contributions. For example, for any given level of defense
expenditure by the alliance, shown in a particular cost curve in
Figure #1, the response of the ally can be determined from the
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Figure 3 Reaction Functions of Two Nations
Source: (Olsen, 1966, p.269)
has a "greater" interest in deterrence, and would place a
higher absolute value on this benefit.
B. THE COMMITMENT-BASED THEORY OF ALLIANCES
More recent theories on alliances have found fault with
the basic premises of the Olsen/Zeckhauser model. For
example, the notion of a "pure" public good provided by the
alliance has been disputed (Sandler/Forbes, 1975). The
deterrence factor of a weapon, its range and its mobility were
all used as gauges to differentiate between the weapon's
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public goods benefits and private goods benefits. These
factors (deterrence value, etc.) could then be used to
determine whether weapons were actually providing a public
good for the alliance, or a private good for the member-
nation supplying it.
Another method of differentiating between the public and
private benefits of a member-nation's contributions is based
upon the commitment level of the alliance members. Terasawa
and Gates have presented a theory that uses the level of
commitment between the allies to defend each other to dif-
ferentiate between the public and private benefits of con-
tributions towards the alliance (Terasawa/Gates, 1990). Their
theory is based on the deterrence value that any weapon or
defense contribution provides to the alliance. A weapon, or
any other resource that increases the cost of aggression to
any potential enemy, provides a deterrence against aggres-
sion. However, to provide deterrence for the alliance the
member-nations of the alliance must not only have the mili-
tary capability to defend the alliance, but must also have the
commitment to use the capability in support of the other al-
liance members.
Nuclear weapons, for example, are considered by the
Olsen/Zeckhauser model and others to be "pure" public goods
for the alliance. However, in the Terasawa/Gates model, the
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weapons are only a public good if their is a committment to
use them in support of each member-nation. In the U.S./Japan
alliance, the U.S. has a vast nuclear arsenal, that comprises
a part of the military capability for alliance defense.
However, theoretically, if the U.S. is perceived as not
committed to using nuclear weapons in defense of Japan, then
the weapons do not provide any deterrence value for Japan.
Without deterrence value for Japan, these weapons provide only
private benefits to the U.S. from the alliance perspective and
not public benefits to the U.S. and Japan.10  In theory, a
contribution towards the alliance that will not be used in
support of every member-nation is capability without commit-
ment. Because it does not meet both of the requirements for
public goods (non-exclusivity and non-rivalrous) it becomes
more of a private good then a public good.
An important point to note in the commitment-based model
is that the perception of the level of commitment is what is
most important, rather than the physical nature of the weapon
system. This is true for both allies and potential aggres-
sors. If Japan believed that the U.S. would use their nuclear
weapons in support of Japan then Japan would feel no need to
build their own nuclear force, as they believe that deterrence
10 However, nuclear deterrence would still be considered a
public good for the U.S. public from a purely U.S. perspective.
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exists. However, if a potential adversary such as the Soviet
Union did not believe in the U.S. commitment to use nuclear
weapons in Japan's support, then the weapons would not be a
deterrence against the Soviets. The actual level between
public and private benefits of allied contributions depends
on the commitment level perceived by potential adversaries.
Under this theory, each country's level of defense
spending would be affected by their allies contribution as in
the Olsen/Zeckhauser model. However, in the commitment-based
model, contributions to the alliance cannot simply measured
by total allied defense spending. Allied defense spending
must be analyzed with the nation's perceptions of their
allies' commitment. If full commitment between the allies
were perce.ved then all defense goods of the member-nations
would be public goods and the Olsen/Zeckhauser model would
apply. However, in a partial commitment model not all of the
defense expenditures of an ally would be public goods. Allied
defense spending is evaluated with the perceived commitment
level of each ally to determine the public and private bene-
fits of each member-nations' contributions. If a member-
nation's commitment is perceived as very low, then its defense
spending provides only private benefits for that individual
nation. The concept of balance of public versus private
benefits is significant because measuring costs consistent
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with this approach may change the determination of what
defense spending should be included in allied contributions,
and perhaps also may alter judgments of what constitutes each
member's "fair share" contributions.
C. JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS OF CONITMUNT AND TEREAT
Despite the demands from the U.S. for increased defense
spending, Japan, as a sovereign nation, will act only in its
own best interest. For Japan to increase its defense spend-
ing to the level the U.S. desires, the Japanese government
and public must perceive some need to go beyond their current
spending level. In the commitment-based model of alliances,
the perceived commitment level of the U.S., not the defense
expenditures, influence Japanese defense spending. In theory,
a perceived low commitment level would increase Japanese
defense spending, where as a higher perceived level would
decrease it. In addition to the commitment level, the level
of the threat perceived by the Japanese also affects their
spending level. If they perceive little threat to Japan, they
will be less inclined to increase their defense spending than
if they perceived a greater threat. Therefore, their level
of spending is dependent upon both their perceptions of U.S.
commitment to defend Japan and of the Soviet and/or regional
threat.
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In simple terms, the Japanese form part of their percep-
tions of the U.S. commitment on the basis of the signals the
U.S. sends them. Because this is a pluralistic society these
signals come from many divergent sources, and often express
differing opinions. The White House, Congress, Department of
State, Department of Defense and the military services, and
the American media are just a few of the many sources of these
signals. These signals may be as subtle as a concession on
some minor issue, or as blatent as congressional or ad-
ministrative Japan-bashing. Such signals may also include
gestures made by the U.S. to our European allies that we do
not extend to Japan.
As discussed in Chapter III, the Japanese public's per-
ceptions is greatly influenced by the Japanese press. The
press in their reporting of world events becomes a filter for
the signals that eminate from the U.S. However, the print
media, especially the top three dailies, are "...generally
left of center when reporting the news." (Kataoka, 1989, p.41)
They have been, especially during the 1970's, usually more
critical of both their own government and the U.S. than the
Soviets, Chinese or North Vietnamese. Often, these govern-
ments were spared harsh criticisms or editorials in the
Japanese press, while the Japanese government was widely
criticized for their actions.
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The opposition parties in the Japanese Diet, knowing the
political leanings of press, have used the media to express
their views of the ruling parties actions. The opposition
parties, through their use of the press, have caused many LDP
leaders to waver on defense issues for fear of negative press
that might contribute to losing their seats in the Diet.
Widespread coverage and heated editorials in the press help
the opposition parties in controversial national security or
defense matters:
The government has tried to minimize public discussion
of security and foriegn policy issues in order to avoid
confrontation with the opposition. But the opposition
parties seek public airing of such issues, mounting
publicity campaigns against certain government policies
both in and out of the Diet. Wide press coverage of heated
Diet interpellations and press exposure of any controver-
sial behavior of the government or of individual government
leaders are helpful to them. (Destler, 1976, p.55)
Because of the influence of the press in shaping the
opinion of the Japanese public, the opposition parties attempt
to use them often to express their views. Japanese public
perception of both the U.S. commitment and the Soviet threat
may, therefore, be controlled more by the opposition parties
through the media, than through the ruling party. This may
explain why the public and the government have such differ-
ing perceptions of both the U.S. commitment and Soviet threat.
Although the press bias appears to have changed somewhat since
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the early 70's, they are still pro-constitution, particularly
Article IX, and remain an effective source of shaping public
perceptions.
The Japanese media and public are convinced that Japan's
success stems from its policy of not squandering resour-
ces on arms, and that America's difficulties stem from its
own massive arms expenditures .... with the help of their
liberal foriegn counterparts, Japan's media retain the
bogey of Japanese militarism and put it to good use.
(Kataoka, 1989, p.52)
1. Perceptions of U.S. Commituent
The Pacific theater has been something of a forgot-
ten stepchild since America withdrew from Vietnam and
Pentagon planners turned their attention back on Europe.
As in World War II, Europe again enjoyed first priority.
Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown appointed a Special
Advisor for NATO Affairs, with no counterpart for the
Pacific, while President Jimmy Carter came close to
withdrawing most American ground forces from Korea. The
western Pacific receded further from American conscious-
ness as the Iranian crisis of 1979 unfolded, as Russia
invaded Afghanistan, and as the Pentagon's focus shifted
to the Persain Gulf. Not only did America's global
strategy hinge on a "swing strategy" that would draw down
resources from the Pacific, if necessary, to defend Europe
first, but most of the Navy and Marine Corps assets put
into the Rapid Deployment Force for Southwest Asia were
taken from US forces in the Pacific. (Schemmer, 1984, p.32)
It was not by chance that Japan initiated the National
Defense Program Outline and embarked upon a new defense stra-
tegy in 1976. The withdrawal of American troops from Viet-
nam and the subsequent fall of Saigon in 1975 capped a steady
decline in American preeminence in Asia. American resolve to
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support its Asian allies came to be doubted. Vietnam, along
with Nixon' s unannounced rapproachment with China and abandon-
ment of Taiwan, and the "Nixon Doctrine" of 1968 led Japanese
observers to reevaluate the U.S./Japan security arrangement.
A 1970 poll found that 39% of the Japanese people surveyed did
not trust America's commitment to defend Japan. By 1974, it
has risen to 60%. (Eikenberry, 1982, p.70)
By the mid 1970's the Japanese public began to believe
that Asia had been relagated to second class status while
Europe once again took center stage (Destler, 1976, pp. 178-
179). The textile issue of 1969-71 is one example of this.
Richard Nixon had promised support for U.S. textile manufac-
tures during his campaign for the 1968 election. Once in
office he began demanding stricter import quotas on Japanese
textiles. Many Japanese believed these to be unfair demands
and ill will began to be felt at many levels of Japanese
government and business. Although Nixon was not the first
President to limit imports, his demands were perceived by many
Japanese to be excessive and the most unyeilding.
Such expectations would not have been present in a negotia-
tion with Great Britain or Germany. Indeed these countries
were major textile exporters to the U.S. market in 1969,
but the U.S. did not even press the issue seriously with
them, much less employ the type of insensitive, sometimes
brutal, negotiating tactics it employed towards Japan.
(Destler, 1976, pp.178-179)
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The U.S.'s "swing shift" strategy of deploying Asian
based units to the Indian Ocean, accelerated Japanese fears
of a weakened U.S. commitment. The Japanese began to believe
that the U.S. was not only incapable of coping withi the
growing Soviet threat, but also lacked the resolve to chal-
lenge the Soviets (Ha, 1980, p.250). General Brown, Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that the U.S. could
not protect vital sea lanes, and Admiral James L. Holloway,
Chief of Naval Operations, stated before Congress that U.S.
ships operated in Sea of Japan at the "tolerance" of the
Soviet navy (Ha, 1980, p.250). Such statements did nothing
to quell Japanese fears. The Yomiuri Shimbun enunciated these
fears in a 1978 editorial when they reported the U.S. an-
nouncement that some Asian based U.S. ships would deploy to
the Atlantic if necessary, and that the remaining U.S. ships
would protect the supply lines between Hawaii, Alaska and the
continental U.S. (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1978, p.1)
The "swing shift" strategy involved deploying units
from Asia, most notably the Seventh Fleet and the Marine units
in Okinawa, to the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf if hostilities
required their intervention. The Japanese SDF would be called
upon to replace the deployed units. This strategy greatly
upset the Japanese since their forces, no match for the
Soviets, would be left alone to defend Japan. They also
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feared that Japan would be used as a jump off point for any
global conflicts, in the process pulling Japan into the
conflict. A U.S./Soviet conflict even in Europe might force
Japan to blockade the straits to the Sea of Japan to remain
a "good" alliance member, drawing Japan into the conflict.
During Team Spirit 78 exercises," the Ttkyo Shimbun echoed
the sentiments of many when it questioned in an editorial
whether Japan should support operations that may involve them
in a U.S. war.
Over the period 1955 to the mid 1970's possibly the
greatest perceived weakness in American resolve to defend
Japan occurred as a result of another Soviet action. Al-
though, Presidents Johnson and Nixon assured Japan that the
U.S. would defend them against any attack, including nuclear
weapons, in 1965 and 1970 respectively, the 1957 launch of
Sputnik spelled an end to American inviolability to nuclear
war (VandeVelde, 1988, p.28). Japan began to question whether
an attack on them would be met with American intervention if
it would lead to a nuclear attack on the American mainland.
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's remarks at a NATO
conference that America's nuclear war strategy, "...which was
Annual large scale exercises between the Republic of Korea
and U.S. forces, particularly those forces stationed in Japan and
Korea.
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established on the basis of 'threat of mutual suicide' can no
longer be maintained," fueled these fears (Sankei, 1979).
2. Perceptions of the Soviet Threat
The Japanese government and public display divergent
views on the Soviet threat. Despite the fact that Soviet
bases are less than 50km from Hokkaido and the continued
Soviet occupation of the formerly Japanese held Northern
islands,1 2 the majority of the Japanese public have opposed
increases in defense spending. The government, however, has
consistently increased spending since the mid 197Q's.
An indication of the differing views of the public and
government is in the accounting for defense expenditures.
When the government initiated the NDPO, Prime Minister Miki
called for a limit of one percent of GNP placed on yearly
defense expenditures. Since that time Japan's expenditures
have fluctuated near this limit, exceeding it the past few
years by only a small amount. Japan, however, uses her own
12 At the close of World War II, the Soviet Union seized the
Japanese northern islands of Kunashirii, Etorofu, Habomais and
Shikotan, claiming that they were part of the Soviet Kurile island
chain. Japan maintains that despite the revised political map of
Asia depicted in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the islands are
still Japanese islands wrongfully occupied by the Soviet Union.
Japan has tried through numerous diplomatic means to regain
possession of them. The Soviets have used the possibility of
returning the islands to Japan as a bargaining chip on more than
one occassion. Although the Japanese and Soviets established
diplomatic relations in 1956, possession of the islands has
continued to be a disputed point.
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method of accounting for defense expenditures, one that does
not count military pensions and some other expenses as defense
expenditures. Some sources have estimated that Japan's
expenditures would be closer to 1.7 percent of GNP if using
the NATO accounting method. (Fallows, 1989, p.18) This
accounting method helps screen from the Japanese public the
true expenditure ratio. The Japanese government can appease
a Japanese public that desires less defense spending by
masking Japan's true defense expenditure/GNP ratio. Japan's
accounting method's drawback for the Japanese government is
that it also produces additional criticism from the U.S. when
Japan is compared to NATO.
The Soviet Union initiated a major buildup of forces
in the Pacific that eventually stretched their Pacific area
from Petropavlovsk to Cam Rahn Bay, Vietnam (see Figure #4).
By 1974, the Soviet Union had 45 divisions in Asia, and had
deployed troops to the disputed Japanese northern islands.
Developments in Soviet defense posture after 1976 increased
Japanese fears as the Soviets deployed SS-20 missiles and
Backfire bombers to Asia, built up the Soviet Pacific fleet
including the ASW carriers Minsk and Novorossivsk, and
installed radar installations, MIG-23's, surface to air mis-
siles, and runways capable of supporting Backfire bombers on
the northern islands. (Simon,1986,p.42)
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North Baltic Black Pacific Total
Sea Sea Sea Fleet Soviet Navy
Surface Combatants
Helicopter Carriers 1 0 1 2 4
Cruisers 10 3 13 13 39
Destroyers 19 12 16 20 67
Frigates 48 27 47 55 177
Total 78 42 77 90 287
Submarines
Strategic 43 6 1 31 81
Artack 142 26 23 91 287
Total 190 32 24 122 368
Amphibious 11 24 25 22 82
Amphibious Warfare 0 30 35 30 95
Underway Replenishment 25 10 25 25 85
Other Support Ships 75 35 45 60 215




Craft, etc.) 225 405 350 455 1,435
Grand Total 604 578 581 802 2,565
Naval Aircraft
Tactical 100 135 100 150 485
Tactical Support - - - - 75
Recon/E\V 85 45 35 80 245
Anfisubmarine Warfare 145 50 100 145 440
Utility 95 45 170 65 375
Total Aircraft 425 275 405 440 1,620
Personnel 119,000 107,000 101,000 134,000 461,000
Figure 4 Soviet Pacific Fleet strength in 1982
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
Soviet naval presence was also increased dramatically
(see Figure #5). The Pacific fleet has become the largest of
the Soviets four fleets, experiencing an eighty percent
increase since the mid 1960's. Quality has increased as well
as quantity. The Soviet Pacific fleet has deployed some of
their most advanced systems. The Soviets naval air arm has
increased as well, including the MIG-23 with a range great
enough to attack U.S. bases in Japan. Some twenty MIG-23's
have been stationed on the northern island of Etorofu. The
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Soviet Pacific navy also includes Backfire bombers that can
distrupt the sea lines of communication (SLOC) as far south
as the Philippines. (Scheinmer, 1984, p.35-36)
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Soviet violations of Japanese air and sea space also
increased during this period (see Figure #6). When Soviet
planes appear to be entering Japanese airspace, a Japanese Air
Self Defense Force plane is "scrambeled" to intercept it. The
number of scrambles increased from 700 to 929 in 1983. One
JSDF plane even fired warning shots to ward off an intruding
Soviet near Okinawa. Violations of the sea space have occured
including the seizing of Japanese fishing vessels near the
northern islands.
Soviet exercises in the Western Pacific increased
Japanese fears as the Soviets displayed their ability to cut
off Japan's SLOC. A 1975 exercise named OKEAN II included
four Soviet task forces operating around Japan. Two posi-
tioned themselves around the Soviet mainland while the other
two positioned themselves along Japan's SLOC.
This exercise and others, including 1983 and 1985 Paci-
fic exercises, with the Novorossiysk carrier battle
group, were primarily shows of strength and demonstra-
ted what has been called 'an operational capability of
severing the links between North America, Western
Europe and Japan. (McIntosh, 1986,pp.77-78)
After a 1985 Soviet exercise simulating an invasion of Hok-
kaido captured the island in only eighteen minutes a Soviet
official commented that a real invasion would "take only
several tens of minutes if we did it in earnest." (McIntosh,
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The Soviet threat in Asia was tragically displayed in
September 1983 when a Soviet MIG shot down a Korean Airlines
747, Flight KE-007, over Sakhalin Island. This action drew
harsh criticism from the international community particularly
Japan. Not only were some of the 269 passengers Japanese, but
the plane was destroyed so close to Japan that the wreckage
landed in the Sea of Japan. The tragedy intensified the
defense debate in the Diet.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE COmOITMNT-BASED MODEL
The commitment-based model of alliances predicts that a
nation's defense spending will be increased by a reduced
commitment perception by the allied nations and/or by an
increased threat perception. During the 1970's, Japan's per-
ception was that the U.S. commitment had diminished, while the
Soviet threat had increased. The "Nixon shocks", President
Carter's announced troop withdrawals, the swing shift strategy
and other incidents led to a perceived weakening of the U.S.
commitment. At the same time, the continuing Soviet buildup
in the Pacific, Soviet violations of Japan's air and sea space
and the downing of Flight KE-007 kept the Japanese perception
of the Soviet threat high. Ronald Reagan's invitation to Chun
Doo Hwan, President of South Korea, to visit the U.S. in 1981
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and his summit with Prime Minister Suzuki were seen as a reaf-
firming of U.S. commitment to Asia. However, later in
Reagan's first term, the U.S. went through a major recession,
which resulted in, among other things, a new round of Japan
bashing. The U.S.'s commitment was again questioned.
The affects that the changing U.S. commitment and Soviet
threat had on Japan's defense spending can be analyzed by
looking at Japan's defense budget in comparison to their
overall budget. One way to measure any change would be to
compare the increases in the percentage of defense outlays to
the percentage increase in the overall Japanese budget. This
would show the relative importance of defense in the overall
budget. If defense increases were larger in relation to
overall budget increases then it may be inferred that defense
took on a greater importance in that fiscal year's budget and
the opposite effect for smaller defense increases. We cannot
just look at defense spending alone as changes in Japan's
economic conditions would affect the totals as well. An
analysis of defense outlays compared to GNP would also be mis-
leading as the GNP fluctuates each year.
Appendix A displays Japan's general account outlay totals
and defense outlay totals for 1965 to 1988. It also includes
the percentage increase of each and the ratio of defense to
overall budget. As displayed in Figure #7 defense outlays de-
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creased as a percentage of total budget consistently over this
period until 1982 when the trend reversed. Defense outlays
also did not increase at the same rate as the overall budget
GENERAL ACCOUNT VS DEFENSE
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Figure 7 General Account Outlays vs Defense Outlays
Source: Prior to 1973 - Japan Economic Yearbook
1973 and later - Rand Corporation
prior to 1982 (see Figure #8). Defense outlays did, however,
increase at a rate greater than the overall budget in JFY's
70, and 76. The only extended period where defense increases
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outpaced overall budget increases occured after 1981. From
1982 to 1988 defense spending increased 43.1 percent vice a
14.1 percent increase in the overall budget. Prior to 1982,
Japan's overall budget increased at an average rate of 19.2
percent while defense averaged only a 15.5 percent increase.
It would appear from this data, that although the Japan-
ese perceived a weakening of the U.S. commitment and an
increase in the Soviet threat during the late 60's and 70's
they did not increase their defense outlays. Most increases
during the period came from increases in the relative size of
the overall budget. It was not until 1982, the year that
Yasuhiro Nakasone became Prime Minister of Japan, that Japan
increased its defense at a rate greater than their total
budget increases. During Nakasone tenure as Prime Minister
U.S./Japanese relations improved as well as U.S. commitment
to Japan. Japan, in addition, also increased its commitment
to the U.S. by taking on greater responsibility in its own
defense (Suzuki's 1000 mile pledge and Nakasone's "unsinkable
aircraft carrier").
However, Japan also perceived a greater Soviet threat
during this time period. The Soviets had invaded Afghani-
stan, shot down a Korean airliner, conducted a mock invasion
of Japan and distruption of supply lines, and been dubbed an
"evil empire" by the President of the U.S. What had been
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Source: Prior to 1973 - Japan Economic Yearbook
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57
perceived as a period of detente between the superpowers in
the 70's became a period of poor superpower relations in the
early 80's. Although U.S. commitment had been perceived as
greater which would, theoretically reduce defense spending,
the increased Soviet threat led the Japanese to increase their
spending. The influence of the U.S. defense build-up, sig-
nifying the U.S.'s evaluation of an increased Soviet threat,
also affected Japanese defense spending.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1988, Japan's defense budget was the fifth largest in
the world, ranking behind the U.S., U.S.S.R., and the major
NATO allies (see TABLE #2). With increases in defense
spending expected to continue, Japan's defense budget should
soon pass that of any individual member nation of NATO.
Although it is apparent that Japan has increased its con-
tributions to the U.S./Japan allied defense effort, from the
U.S. perspective Japan can still afford to do more. While
NATO struggles to maintain an average near three percent of
their GNP, Japan continues to fund its defense at about one
percent.13 (Defense, 1989, p. 96) Continuation of this policy
in light of the U.S./Japan trade imbalance and the U.S.
federal budget deficit appears likely to cause more "Japan-
bashing" and criticisms of Japan's "free ride."
As discussed in Chapter IV, Japanese contributions appear
to be affected more by their perceptions of the Soviet threat
than by their perceptions of U.S. commitment. Political
changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union soon may carry
over into Asia and bring about Soviet arms reductions there.
13 Closer to 2.0 percent using the NATO accounting method
which includes military pensions and other personnel costs as
defense outlays (see pg. 44-45)
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TASLZ #2
DMASURZS OF DZEESZ ZXPZNDITURZS
(1988 Constant Dollars in Billions - 1988 Exchange Rates)
Measures
Total Total Defense GDP per
Nations Defense Defense Percent capita
Spending per capita of GDP
U.S. $293.09 $1190 6.1% $19513
Japan $28.90 $236 1.0% $23207
U.K. $34.68 $608 4.2% $14385
Germany $35.10 $574 2.9% $19665
France $36.07 $646 3.8% $17003
Belgium $4.10 $415 2.8% $14926
Canada $10.02 $386 2.1% $18583
Denmark $2.32 $451 2.2% $20940
Greece $3.38 $337 6.4% $5244
Italy $20.43 $356 2.5% $14430
Luxemborg $0.09 $229 1.3% $17478
Netherlands $6.73 $456 3.0% $15371
Norway $2.89 $687 3.2% $21667
Portugal $1.35 $131 3.2% $4061
Spain $7.17 $184 2.1% $8721
Turkey $2.66 $49 4.1% $1209
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
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If these arms reductions occur, Japanese public perception of
the Soviet threat may change. If so, this change will make
it even more difficult for Japan's Liberal Democratic Party
to increase defense spending to the higher levels called for
by U.S. policy makers. U.S. policy makers, in turn, may ask
for greater contributions from U.S. allies as the U.S. defense
budget is reduced. In addition to the constraints on spending
discussed in the commitment-based model, there exists the
numerous legal, political and social constraints against
growth in Japanese defense spending analyzed in Chapter III.
Despite the constraints faced by the Japanese government,
there are several areas where Japan can increase its con-
tributions in ways that may be acceptable to all parties in
the policy enviroment. Increased host nation support is one
way that Japan can raise their contributions. Increased con-
tributions to fund housing or other military support facili-
ties has been generally more acceptable to the Japanese public
than increased spending on tanks, missiles or other "war
potential." This also would likely be more acceptable to
members of the U.S. Congress. U.S. funding for overseas
construction is politically difficult to appropriate in the
Congress and easy to cut, since it does not affect any
congressional districts. Japan's Asian neighbors also would
be more receptive to the continued U.S. presence in Asia
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versus large increases in Japanese defense forces. However,
increasing their support for U.S. forces will by no means ease
any Japanese fears of being drawn into an American conflict
in other parts of the world.
The Facilities Improvement Program, for example, is an
area where contributions may be increased without adverse
political consequences. Military family and bachelor enlisted
housing is in short supply in Japan and is the one of the most
needed projects according to U.S. military priorities. Many
service members now must wait from eight to sixteen months to
receive on-base housing and in the interim rent off base
housing that is small, costly and lacks many of the basic
amenities of American housing. In addition, many junior
enlisted members cannot afford adequate off-base housing due
to the yen/dollar exchange rate.
The assumption of additional yen-based, U.S. costs by the
Japanese including utilities on U.S. bases would relieve some
of the burden to the U.S. of stationing forces in Japan.
Japanese contributions towards funding labor costs also could
be further increased to cover the salaries of Government of
Japan employees who work for the U.S. armed forces. However,
this proposal might be more difficult to pass through Japan's
Diet. Although Japan has increased wage and benefit labor
cost contributions to pay for Japanese employees working for
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the U.S. military directly, the 1987 agreement requiring the
Diet's approval, signaled Japan's reluctance to increase their
contributions under the existing Status Of Forces Agreement
(SOFA). U.S. officials are hesitant to open negotiations on
the SOFA, fearing the Japanese will seek to further restrict
some U.S. military base access and training rights on Japanese
soil. U.S. officials hope to amend only required articles of
the treaty as provided in Article XXVII of the SOFA.
Additional areas of importance to policy makers related
to the topic of U.S./Japan burdensharing that this thesis has
not addressed include the following that may be investigated
by future research:
(1) While Japan has increased the equipment of the Self
Defense Forces to include such high-tech platforms as AEGIS
cruisers, they still allot far fewer funds for training,
ammunition and spare parts. Although the SDF has improved,
readiness is still low. Is this a cause for Japanese buying
of equipment merely to satisfy U.S. demands while not believ-
ing the U.S.'s perceptions of the Soviet threat? If the U.S.
is going to rely on the Japanese SDF in the event of conflict,
should not the U.S. demand more readiness and supplies
availabilities from the Japanese? Is this tolerance of
Japan's lack of readiness an indication of the U.S.'s percep-
tions of the Soviet threat in the Pacific?
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(2) If the U.S. Congress pushes the Japanese government
too hard to increase their defense expenditures during a time
of reduced threat, what will be the implications for U.S./Jap-
an relationships? Will the Japanese ask the U.S. to withdraw
U.S. forces? What implications would this action have upon
Japan's defense expenditures and the balance of power in Asia?
(3) What effects will reductions in the U.S.'s defense
budget have upon U.S. forces in Japan? If Japan's perception
of the Soviet threat is diminished what implications will this
have for Japan's defense budget?
Despite former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's
assertion that burdensharing encompasses both material and
intangible contributions, interest has consistently been
focused on the dollar amounts contributed towards the common
defense (Defense, 1988, p.1). These contributions are easily
measured, tied to an index such as the GNP and compared with
those of other nations. However, this method "...tends to
oversimplify the problem and shift focus away from the real
issue, i.e. the need to redefine roles, risks and respon-
sibilities." (Defense, 1989, p.15) Although, U.S./Japan
defense relations have entered a new phase in discussing the
roles and responsibility of each ally, this thesis has
primarily discussed the burden of defense.
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While Japan should reach the goals of the National De-
fense Program Outline in 1991, there are few current indica-
tions that Japan will substantially increase its defense
expenditures in the period through the mid 1990's. It appears
that, by meeting the requirements of the National Defense
Program Outline, Japan will possess the minimum forces neces-
sary to fulfill its pledge of defending its sealanes out to
1000 miles (GAO/NSIAD, 1989, p.14). Japan has indicated that
it will continue to modernize its forces and, in this spirit,
has decided to build two AEGIS class naval destroyers and to
develop an advanced fighter aircraft. Even if Japan does not
substantially increase its own forces, Japan can strengthen




Japanese General Account Outlays and
Defense Outlays
(Yen Billion)
General Acct Percent Defense Percent Defense %
JFY Outlays Chancie Outlays Change of General
1965 3744.7 305.3 8.15%
1966 4459.2 19.08% 345.7 13.23% 7.75%
1967 5110.0 14.59% 383.5 10.93% 7.50%
1968 5937.1 16.19% 432.9 12.88% 7.29%
1969 6917.8 16.52% 496.7 14.74% 7.18%
1970 8187.7 18.36% 590.6 18.90% 7.21%
1971 9659.0 17.97% 693.5 17.42% 7.18%
1972 11467.7 18.73% 800.2 15.39% 6.98%
1973 14284.1 24.56% 935.5 16.91% 6.55%
1974 17099.4 19.71% 1093.0 16.84% 6.39%
1975 21288.8 24.50% 1327.3 21.44% 6.23%
1976 24296.0 14.13% 1512.4 13.95% 6.22%
1C77 28514.3 17.36% 1690.6 11.78% 5.93%
1978 34295.0 20.27% 1901.0 12.45% 5.54%
1979 38600.1 12.55% 2094.5 10.18% 5.43%
1980 42588.8 10.33% 2230.2 6.48% 5.24%
1981 46788.1 9.86% 2400.0 7.61% 5.13%
1982 49680.8 6.18% 2586.1 7.75% 5.21%
1.,83 50379.6 1.41% 2754.2 6.50% 5.47%
1984 50627.2 0.49% 2934.6 6.55% 5.80%
1)85 52499.6 3.70% 3137.1 6.90% 5.98%
1986 54088.6 3.03% 3343.5 6.58% 6.18%
1387 54101.0 0.02% 3517.4 5.20% 6.50%
1988 56699.7 4.80% 3700.3 5.20% 6.53%
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